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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

NASOS SEVASTOPOULOS and
KATHLEEN SEVASTOPOULOS,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS,
vs,
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH,

Case No. 920683 CA

APPELLEE/RESPONDENTS.

Priority No. 15

Appeal from the Decision of the District Court Granting Summary
Judgment and Dismissing Action in Fav-.r of the
Board of Adjustment

The

Sevastopoulos',

Petitioners

herein,

respectfully

provide their appellate brief as follows:

JURISDICTION
Pursuant to § 78-2a-3 (2) (b), Utah Code Annotated,

the Court

of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of appeals from the
district court review of the decision made by an agency in an
adjudicative proceeding.
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether

the

Board

of Adjustment

disregarded

due

process requirements during the hearing conducted on September
16, 1991?

2.

Whether review by the District Court was limited to

the Administrative Record?

3.

Whether the Board of Adjustment complied with its

statutory mandate?

4.

Whether the "findings11 were supported by evidence?

THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Point 1:

As to Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3:

The review by the District Court should not have been
limited to the administrative record.

The District Court's

affirmance of the Board of Adjustment Order was incorrect
because the hearing before the Board of Adjustment did not
proceed

in

accordance

with

due

process

requirements.

Consequently, the District Court should have held a trial de
novo,

Xanthos

1984) .

v.

Board

of Adjustment,

685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah

The District Court determined not to grant a trial de

novo because of its interpretation of the controlling standard
of review, which is a question of law. Accordingly, this Court
2

can review the decision of the District Court without giving
deference thereto, as a correction of legal error.
Utah v. Johnson,

State

of

821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991).

The question of improper interpretation by an agency of the
controlling statutes and ordinances, is a correction of error
standard, with no deference given to the agency.

International,

Inc.

v. Auditing

Division

Morton

of the Utah State Tax

Coram., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

The "supplemental findings" and orders of the Board of
Adjustment are contrary to the applicable statutory and judicial
authority.

The standard for review is a correction of error

standard, with no deference given to the agency.
International,

Point 2:

Inc.,

Morton

814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

As to Issue No. 4:

The "findings" and decision of the Board of Adjustment are
contrary to the applicable statutory and judicial authority.
The standard for review is a correction of error standard, with
no deference given to the agency. Morton International,

Inc.,

814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

The findings of fact of the Board of Adjustment are
contrary to the substantial evidence introduced at the hearing
3

on this matter. The standard of review is whether "'the agency
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court.111
International,

Inc.,

Administrative

Point 3;

814

Procedures

P.2d

Act,

581,

585

Morton

(quoting

Utah

§ 63-46b(4)(g)).

As to the Grant of Summary Judgment by the District
Court:

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure,

states that

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
In the present case, there are sufficient facts at issue to deny
the grant of summary judgment. This Court should remand for the
occurrence of an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts due
to the failure of the Board of Adjustment to make findings from
competent evidence.

That hearing should be held in accordance

with standards of due process.

4

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS
The Fifth Amendment of the United

States

Constitution

states as follows:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning Due process of law and just compensation
clauses]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

Article 1 § 7 of the Constitution

of

Utah

states as

follows:
[Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
1.

On or about June 25, 1991, appellants filed a petition

for a variance request with the Board of Adjustment,

2.

A hearing on the Variance Request first was held on

September 16, 1991,
5

3.
meeting.

Appellants did not receive written notice of the
They received notice of this hearing approximately

one-half hour prior to its commencement.

4.

On or about October 8, 1991, the Board of Adjustment

issued its First Findings and Order for Case No. 1549-B.

5.

On or about February 27, 1992, appellants filed a

Petition for Judicial Review with the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and a Request
for Rehearing with the Board of Adjustment.

6.

On or about January 6, 1992, the Board of Adjustment

reheard the case regarding the Variance Request. It issued its
Findings and Order for Case No. 1549-B on or about January 28,
1992.

7.

On or about August 24, 1992, the Honorable Pat B.

Brian entered an Order granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing
Action in favor of the Board of Adjustment.

8.

On September 23, 1992, appellants filed a Petition for

Review.

6

9.

On October 19, 1992, the Sevastopoulosf

filed a

docketing statement with this Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Petitioners reside in a home located at 1425 East

Tomahawk Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The home is owned by a

trust having its beneficiary as Kathleen Smith Sevastopoulos.
Marion B. Smith is the trustee for the trust.

See Variance

Request, and Findings & Order, dated September 1991 ("1991
Findings") and January

1992

("1992 Findings"), and the

Transcript of Board of Adjustment Case No. 1549-B, occurring on
January 6, 1992 ("Transcript") , p. 13, which are included in the
Addendum to the Brief of Appellants as Exhibits "A", "B", "C"
and "D", respectively, and which are incorporated herein by this
reference.

2.

Petitioners commenced the construction of a fence on

both side yards of their property in about May 1991. See
Transcript, Exhibit "D", p. 3.

3.

Petitioners were informed that they did not need a

permit to have the fence built and hired a contractor to perform
the work.

1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2.

7

4.

The fence is a concrete and block wall faced with

stucco.

See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3, and pictures

presented to Board of Adjustment during the January 27, 1992
hearing ("Pictures"), which are included in the Addendum as
Exhibit ffEfl and incorporated herein by this reference.

5.

During the construction of the fence, a dispute arose

between the petitioners and the neighbors directly to the east.
As a result of that dispute, a complaint was made to Salt Lake
City regarding the fence and a representative from the City came
to the house.

See 1991 Findings, Exhibit

"B", and 1992

Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 1.

6.

The City then requested that the work stop because the

fence violated Salt Lake City ordinances and a special permit
would be required.

7*

See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 5.

The work ceased at the request of the City and the

pictures demonstrate the incomplete construction.

See 1992

Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 5; and pictures, Exhibit "E".

8.

The fence remains uncompleted. 1992 Findings, Exhibit

"C", p. 5; Pictures, Exhibit "E".

8

9.

On June 25, 1991, Marion B. Smith, as trustee, and

Kathleen Smith Sevastopoulos, petitioned the Board of Adjustment
for a variance to allow the completion and retention of the
fence.

See Variance Request, Exhibit "A11.

10.

The purpose for requesting the variance was

to allow the construction of a fence approximately 8
feet in height. The variance is requested in order to
provide security for the swimming pool located on the
property. Due to the steep grade on the lot which
required the driveway be cut below grades the eight
foot height is requested to provide security for the
pool area.
See Variance Request, Exhibit "A".

11.

Further, the Variance Request provides that "Due to

the steep grade on the lot, the driveway located along the
property line where the fence is constructed, has been cut below
grade.1

The resulting fence height from the high side is

therefore low enough to be crossed by children in the area."
See Variance Request, Exhibit "A".

12.

The safety to be obtained by the fence was important

to the Petitioners because, among other reasons, 1) the trustee,
Ms. Marion Smith, lived in a neighborhood in which a child had
climbed into a neighbor's pool and drowned; 2) Petitioners often
1

The driveway was built below grade by the previous
owners of the home.
9

leave their residence for extended periods while travelling; 3)
the neighbors' children had gotten into Petitioners' back yard
to play basketball; and 3) Petitioners had suffered difficulties
with neighbors to the east, involving invasion of privacy, as a
result of which police were called.

See Transcript, Exhibit

"D", p. 13.

13.

The fence, as built but unfinished, is on the west and

east sides of the property.

It traverses up the slope from the

front of Petitioners' property. The fence has the architectural
design as follows:

i
The length of each side of the fence is approximately 101.82
feet on the petitioners' property.

The fence steps at various

intervals in response to the increasing slope on the back of
petitioners' property.
14.

On the west side of Petitioners1 property, the fence

has been completed.

Approximately 75.75 feet of the fence is

equal to or less than five feet (5') high in relation to the
highest abutting property level, leaving 26.07 feet at eight and
10

one-eighth feet (8V) to eleven and one-quarter feet (11?f) in
height. This is the highest side of the fence. See engineering
diagram regarding "Walls Along Property Lines", which was
provided to the Board of Adjustment and was attached to
Petitioners' Response to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Wall
Diagram").

15.
also,

See Transcript, p. 6, Exhibit "D".

On the east side, the fence is not finished.

is approximately

101.82

feet

long

It,

on Petitioners'

property. It steps at various intervals in conjunction with the
slope of the land. A driveway was built by the previous owner,
for which a grade change was authorized and a retaining wall
installed.

The top of this retaining wall substantially

parallels the neighbors1 land.
addition to this retaining wall.

The new fence included an
In total, the new fence

exceeds the six foot height requirement on eight and threequarters feet (8W) , leaving approximately 93.07' of fence that
is equal to or less than the limitation.

16.

See Wall Diagram.

A hearing on the Variance Request first was held on

September 16, 1991. See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p.l.

17.

Neither the petitioners, nor Ms. Marion B. Smith,

received written notice of the meeting.

In fact, the City

admitted that neither Ms. Smith nor the Sevastopoulos' received
11

written notice.

Accordingly, petitioners received telephonic

notice of this hearing approximately one-half (?) hour prior its
commencement. All other "interested parties", however, received
notice of the hearing substantially in advance of the meeting.
See Transcript, p. 2, Exhibit "D"; Petition for Judicial Review,
which

is included

in the Addendum as Exhibit

"F" and is

incorporated herein by this reference; and the Request for Rehearing, which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "G" and
incorporated herein by this reference.

18.

During the hearing, information was provided to the

Board of Adjustment, and summarized in the 1991 Findings. This
information includes the following testimony
(George Buys of Bush & Gudgell Consulting Engineers,
Inc., spoke on behalf of the petitioners): the
property owners are out of town for extended lengths
of time and security for the swimming pool and back
yard area is very important.
. . . there was a
retaining wall that allowed access into the
applicants' rear yard. The applicants1 intent is to
provide security for the swimming pool by adding the
block fence on top of the retaining wall. . . . there
are a number of walls in the area that exceed the 6foot height.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2.
(Captain Sevastopoulos): his neighbor's wooden fence
was deteriorating and their children climb over the
fence to play basketball in his back yard. . . . he
travels extensively with his business and is fearful
that one of the children or their friends might fall
into the pool.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2.
12

he was told by the contractor that a permit for
the cinder-block fence was not needed. . . • some
neighborhood fences are as high as his is. He told of
neighborhood difficulties and problems with family
members in the neighborhood that have contributed to
the ill will against he and his wife.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.
(Mr. Taylor): he recently received a petition signed
by numerous neighbors who are opposed to the fence
height.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.
(Judith Moyle, resident of Tomahawk Drive, but not an
abutting property owner): states that she serves on
the Architectural Committee, however, later it is
determined that the Architectural Committee on which
she serves does not regulate petitioners1 property.
She too has a pool, two dogs and is concerned about
small children, but feels that the 6-foot fence around
her property is adequate.
the city zoning requirements will be maintained
if there is a conflict with the private covenants.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.
(Faith Cortrell, resident of Tomahawk Drive, but not
an abutting property owner): there was a wellmaintained brown wood fence between the applicant's
property and the adjacent property. There is also a
guard-dog on the Smith property that would prevent
children from entering their back yard.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.
But see pictures of "well maintained fence" presented to the
Board of Adjustment.
(Jean Calder, resident of Tomahawk Drive and abutting
property owner to the east of petitioners' property):
the walls are much too high especially on the west
side [not the side next to her p r o p e r t y ] . . . . she
does not feel the applicants1 pool represents a
security risk because they have an existing wall and
13

gate plus a gate in the driveway, as well as a guard
dog and a pool cover.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.

19.

The Board of Adjustment then went into Executive

Session.

Whereupon, "Mr. Fenn made a motion to approve a

special exception for the fence to exceed the height limit to a
maximum of 6 feet from the neighbor's ground level on the east
side in a parallelogram configuration; the fence on the west
side may not exceed the 6 feet from the ground level as measured
from the neighbor's side of the fence."

See 1991 Findings,

Exhibit "B", p. 4.

20.

"The motion was seconded by Mr. Hafey.

All voted

"Aye" except Mr. Chambless who voted "No". The motion carried
by a vote of three to one." See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p.
4.

21.

Subsequently,

petitioners

filed

a

Petition

for

Judicial Review with the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and a Request for Rehearing
with the Board of Adjustment.
respectively.

14

See Exhibits "F" and "G",

22.

Thereafter, Petitioners

attempted

to obtain and

provide information to the City concerning this and other
issues.

23.

The Board of Adjustment agreed to re-hear the Variance

Request. On January 6, 1992, the second hearing occurred. See
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C".

24.

In the 1992 Findings & Order, the Board summarizes the

information obtained during the hearing; however, it failed to
make any findings of fact.

25.

See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C".

The 1992 Findings & Order contain the following

information that is relevant to this proceeding:
(Mr. Taylor): the applicants1 attorney requested a
rehearing of this case based on improper notice. He
said the applicants' notice was returned to the city
the day of the meeting. This did not allow time to
remail the notice to the proper address. Mr. Taylor
said that in an attempt to remedy the problem, the
applicants were notified by telephone on the afternoon
of the September 16 meeting, but they felt it was not
sufficient time to prepare for the hearing. He said
that Bruce Baird, the Board's attorney, recommended
rehearing the case.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 1.
(Mr. Wheelwright) : the wall varies in height from 11
to 14 feet.
[But see the Wall Diagram].
The
applicant maintains that the excessive height is
needed for security reasons. Planning Staff believes
it is for visual impairment into the rear yard area.

15

. . . the pool's motorized cover wa^ ^stalled by the
Fields when they had the pool constructed.2
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2.
(Ms, Flanders, representing the petitioners): the
increased height of the fence is to prevent children
from getting into the swimming pool area. Prior to
constructing the higher walls, there were problems of
this nature. . . . her clients are out of the country
approximately six months out of the year.
Their
concern is for the safety of the neighborhood
children. . . . the electronic pool cover does not
make conditions safer; the combination of water and
electricity actually creates a more dangerous
situation.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2.
there is no guard dog on her clients' property,
only a large dog. . . . this animal is boarded each
time her clients leave the country for an extended
period of time; therefore, it would not be a hindrance
to children getting into the back yard.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2.
a number of neighbors have signed a petition
indicating they have no objection to the height of the
fence. . . . it would be very costly to conform to the
height restriction because the fence has already been
faced with stucco.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
Ms. Flanders presented photographs of a wooden
fence along the east property line. . . . the wooden
structure has been referred to in previous testimony
by the neighbors as a 'well-preserved fence', but the
photographs show otherwise. . . . a child could very
easily climb over the wooden fence.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
2

The Fields' were the previous property owners. A letter
was introduced by Mr. Wheelwright that allegedly was authored by
Mr. Fields and had been faxed from California for substantive
evidence in the proceeding. 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2.
16

one of the considerations to be made in a
determination for a special permit or a variance is
how well the fence fits in with the neighborhood. She
presented photographs of other fences in the immediate
neighborhood to show that granting the variance
requested by the applicants will not be in conflict
with surrounding properties.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
the head of the Home Owners Association has
signed a petition as an individual stating there is no
objection to the height of the walls.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
(Mr. Calder, resident of Tomahawk Drive and abutting
property owner to the east): there are no masonry
walls along Tomahawk Drive that come anywhere near a
fifteen-foot height.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
(Mr. Gordon Roberts, counsel for Scott and Jean
Calder): presented a petition signed by additional
neighbors as of January 1, 1992, stating their
opposition to the fence height.3
The applicants
should be required to live with the decision made by
the Board in September of last year.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3 - 4.
(Judith Moyle, a resident of Tomahawk Drive, but not
an abutting property owner) : Mr. Hal Hawk, who is the
sole representative of the architectural review
committee for the home at 1425 E. Tomahawk Drive,4
has not given any variances on height outside the
limits of the covenants.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4.

3

The neighbors signed three petitions regarding this
Variance Request, some of which signed all three petitions.
4

Mr. Hawk was not present at the hearing. See 1992
Findings, Exhibit "C", regarding record of appearances.
17

(Marion Smith, trustee of the trust owning the subject
property) : She has had the experience of living in a
neighborhood where there was a 4-foot wall around a
swimming pool. Several children climbed the wall and
one of them drowned. She said that when the present
owners consulted her about the wall, she advised them
to do everything necessary to protect children from
the pool.
She said this obviously was not good
advice, but she said the wall was built in good faith
to protect the neighborhood children.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4.
(Captain Sevastopoulos, resident of the subject
property):
he travels extensively and wants to
protect himself from any liability which may result
from the neighborhood children gaining access to the
pool. . . . the increased height of the fence is
needed to provide this protection.
1992 Findings, Exhibit

ff

C", p. 4.

(Dr. Lynn Pershing, a resident of Tomahawk Drive, but
not an abutting property owner):
the applicants1
concern for the safety of the neighborhood children is
commendable, but . . . there has been no problem in
this regard with the other pools in the neighborhood.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4.

26.

The Committee then went into Executive Session. Mr.

Fenn, a member of the Board, stated that "a good contractor with
a concrete saw could cut the offending points down in a matter
of one-half hour.5

He, then, moved to continue the variance

previously granted, whereby the fence would be allowed to six
feet from the highest abutting land.
was

conditioned

upon

resolution

5

This variance, however,

of encroachments

on city

There was no evidence or testimony to support this
statement.
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property.6 The Board of Adjustment continuously was informed
that the issue concerning encroachments was not within its
jurisdiction. See Transcript, Exhibit "D", p. 1; 1992 Findings,
Exhibit "C", p. 6.

27.

The Board of Adjustment approved the motion of Mr,

Fenn, with one abstention and three in favor.
Findings, Exhibit

28.

See 1992

lf

C", p. 6.

The Board of Adjustment is in possession of several

exhibits presented during the hearing, which were not included
in the record, including the three petitions, pictures, maps,
and diagrams.

29.

See e.g., Transcript, Exhibit "D", pp. 6, 9.

The Sevastopoulos» filed a Petition for Review with

the Third Judicial District Court.

30.

The Board of Adjustment filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, which requested the District Court to rule that it had

6

Petitioners had been informed by the City and Counsel
for the City that the subject and issues regarding encroachment
on City property, which has been caused by numerous residents of
Tomahawk Drive, as well as other areas in the City, would not be
an issue in this hearing and that Petitioners should limit their
comments and presentation to disregard this matter.
See
Transcript, Exhibit "D", pp. 1, 15-16.
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no

jurisdiction

to

consider

the

factual

findings

or the

applicable law in regard to the agency action.

31.

The Sevastopoulos1 opposed the Motion for Summary

Judgment.

Their

Memorandum

asserted

the

due

process

requirements had not been met and the agency had not followed
its statutory mandate to deny the variance.

32.

Prior to the Order of the Third Judicial District

Court, Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, the Board of Adjustment
did not make any findings of fact and did not consider the
statutory requirements for granting and denying the variance
request.

33.

See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 6.

Consequently, the Court required the agency to enter

"Supplemental Findings" in support of its decision.

A copy of

the Supplemental Findings is included in the Addendum as Exhibit
"H" and incorporated herein by this reference.

34.

Thereafter, the Court entered its Order Granting the

Motion for Summary Judgment, a copy of which is included in the
Addendum

as

Exhibit

"I" and

reference.
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incorporated

herein

by

this

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The issues that are at the heart of this case involve the
extent of due process to which petitioners should be entitled in
a variance hearing.

In the present case, the Sevastopoulos1

were denied the right to even expect competent evidence.

Prior to the first hearing before the Board of Adjustment,
petitioners

received

a

one-half

hour

telephonic

notice.

Conversely, all other "interested parties" received substantial
notice by mail.

During the second hearing, the Board of

Adjustment considered "evidence" from non-present witnesses. It
also listened to testimony regarding issues that the City and
the City's Counsel had stated were outside the jurisdiction of
the Board and would not be considered in this hearing, and thus,
were supposed to have been prohibited from consideration.
Although petitioners may not be entitled to all of the penumbra
of rights granted in a formal judicial forum, certainly there
should be due process protections. This Court should consider
the standard of review in light of those protections.

At the first hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Petitioners/Appellants argued that the Court could consider
additional evidence because of the lack of due process in the
earlier

informal hearing.

Although

the Court did grant

Petitioners1 request to mandate the making of findings of fact
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to support the decision of the Board of Adjustment, the Court
determined that it could not hold a trial de novo and must defer
to the Board of Adjustment. Thus, the Court granted the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by the Board of Adjustment.

ARGUMENT I
THE HEARINGS DID NOT OCCUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
The essence of the concept of due process is fair play and
the idea that if an interest being defended is of value, the
defendant ought to have his or her day in court and a real
opportunity to be heard.

Further, due process aims at "fair

dealing, adequate hearing, and the opportunity to be heard."
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional
Co. v. Washington,

Point l:

Law § 813.

International

Shoe

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

The First Hearing Was Given Without Sufficient Notice
To Meet Due Process Requirements.

Many jurisdictions firmly have established that due process
requires adequate notice of proceedings given to persons whose
interests are affected so that these persons have an opportunity
to be heard.

In the instant case, the first hearing was given

without sufficient notice to meet due process requirements. In
fact, the appellants received a one-half hour telephonic notice,
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while other "interested parties" received sufficient written
notice to prepare for the meeting.

This case is remarkably similar to Gibbons v. Arizona
Comm., 390 P.2d 582 (Ariz. 1964).

In Gibbons,

Corp.

the Arizona

Corporation Commission reinstated a certificate of convenience
and necessity held by another corporation.

At the time the

hearing was conducted, a commissioner informed the attorney for
Motor Carriers by telephonic notice of the hearing and its
purposes. Id.

at 585. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the

telephonic notice given in this case, at the time the hearing
was being held, did not afford an opportunity to be heard.

In addition, in the instant case, the Salt Lake City
Attorney, the Planning Staff and the Board of Adjustment
confirmed the issues to be addressed during the second hearing
and instructed the Sevastopoulos1 to refrain from making any
presentation regarding the "encroachment" issues.7

They were

7

The "encroachment" issues, briefly, involve numerous
residents, including the Petitioners, that have landscaped on
City owned property located in the foothills. The City is
developing a policy concerning the treatment and potential
resolution of these encroachments. Such policy development is
an action independent from the adjudicative proceeding which
resulted in the decision by the Board now being appealed by the
Sevastopoulos'. It must be an independent action because it
does affect numerous residents city wide.
In fact, to date, the Sevastopoulos1 have not been informed
of the finalization of any formal policy by the City.
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told that no response would be appropriate or allowed. Yet, the
determination of the Board of Adjustment considered the issues
of encroachment and restricted the variance granted to the
Sevastopoulos1

based

on

these

issues.

Of

course,

the

Sevastopoulos1 were not prepared to respond to the encroachment
issues, and such consideration violated their right to notice
and true opportunity to be heard.

Although the Board of Adjustment graciously listened to the
information

provided at the second

hearing, there was no

discussion of the evidence provided at the meeting and there was
no deliberation regarding the standards for granting or denying
the variance requested by the Sevastopoulos'.

Many of the

testimonials included a reference that the Sevastopoulos1 should
be required to "live by" the previous decision of the Board of
Adjustment. Consequently, the Board adopted the same result as
it previously reached with additional restrictions based on the
encroachment issues.
Point 2;

The Admissibility Of Hearsay Evidence Should Have Been
Limited.

Many courts hold that hearsay evidence is admissible in
administrative proceedings, as long as admission of the evidence
meets the tests of fundamental fairness and probity.
Torres

v. I.N.S.,

898 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990);
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BustosCalderon-

Ontiveros

v. I.N.S.,

Hernandez

v. I.N.S.,

809 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1986);

Trias-

528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1975).

Courts even have observed

that hearsay

evidence may

constitute substantial evidence if it has probative value and
bears indicia of reliability. Calhoun v. Bailar,
149 (9th Cir. 1980) .

The Calhoun

626 F.2d 145,

Court recognized that no

bright line test can be established to determine whether
evidence is probative and bears the indicia of reliability. To
assist the analysis, however, the Court adopted a number of
factors

to

consider.

These

factors

include

(1)

the

consideration of statements that are signed and sworn to as
opposed to anonymous, oral, or unsworn; (2) whether or not the
statements are contradicted by direct testimony; (3) whether or
not the declarant is available to testify and, if so, whether or
not the party objecting to the hearsay statements subpoenas the
declarant; (4) the credibility of the declarant if a witness, or
of the witness testifying to the hearsay; (5) and whether or not
the hearsay is corroborated.

In the

Id.

at 149.

instant case, a letter

from Mr. Fields was

introduced. This letter was not notarized and there appears to
be questions of authenticity. Appellants were not afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Fields, or to verify the
authenticity of the letter. In fact, appellants were denied a
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copy of the letter and any information from which Mr. Fields
could be located (appellants understand that Mr. Fields is a
resident of California). Appellants, therefore, were prejudiced
by the introduction of this letter.8

In addition, the Board considered hearsay statements from
Ms.

Moyle

as to

the

determinations

of the

Committee for the Sevastopoulosf property.

Architectural

The Committee was

not present and Ms. Moyle is not a member thereof. Yet, members
of the Board of Adjustment were quite concerned with the
information alleged by Ms. Moyle as to the intentions of the
Committee.

Other evidence was considered by the Board from neighbors,
who may have been providing information in good faith, but had
no personal knowledge of the events in question, particularly
concerning the children actually getting into the back yard of
the Sevastopoulos1 property.

8

This letter purported to provide evidence that children
had not been a problem on the property. This was the only
evidence contrary to thit provided by Captain Sevastopoulos that
could be considered to be from personal knowledge. Yet, the
information was provided by a faxed letter, without any
verification or ability of the Sevastopoulos' to question the
substance therein.
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Further, in direct contravention of the pictures shown,
there was evidence that the Sevastopoulosf did not need to build
a fence on the east side because there was a pre-existing, well
maintained wood fence on the property. The pictures of the wood
fence demonstrate, without a doubt, that it was not in good
condition and that it would not deter a child from getting into
the back yard of the Sevastopoulos1 property.9

The vast amount of evidence considered by the Board of
Adjustment that was against the variance request, did not
exhibit the degree of reliability and probativeness to be
useable in an adjudicative proceeding.
Sevastopoulos1

The rights of the

to confront witnesses and to require some

authentication have been violated.
entitled to a trial de novo

The Sevastopoulos1 are

in an objective forum on their

variance request.

9

A curious fact exists when examining the pictures of the
wood fence. From the east property belonging to the Calders, it
is possible to see that the fence of the Sevastopoulos1, reaches
above the wood fence only on its architectural points, i.e. only
because it is designed differently from the slat wood fence on
the Calder's property.
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ARGUMENT II
REVIEW BY THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT LIMITED
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
In the present case, the Board of Adjustment did not make
Findings of Fact from which the Court could review and consider
the Order issued by the Board until after the Court determined
to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. Certainly, there can
be no consideration of "findings" by the District Court if there
are none.

The "Findings & Order" made by the Board after each

adjudicative proceeding simply summarize "testimony" given in
the hearing by various individuals, repeat the motion made by
the Board, and identify the vote. In addition, the information
provided to the District Court did not include all Exhibits
presented

to the Board of Adjustment and the Petitioners

objected to the lack of inclusion of all information. Finally,
there were no reasons

ven by the Board of Adjustment for its

determination, its ju

*nt of credibility, or other relevant

matters.

The "Administrative Record" is deficient and the

District Court was entitled to receive competent evidence to
make a determination as to whether the Order of the Board of
Adjustment was reasonable in light of all of the evidence.

Section 10-9-15, Utah

Code Annotated,

provides that an

aggrieved party may "'maintain a plenary action for relief1"
from any determination of the Board of Adjustment by filing a
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Petition for Judicial Review within thirty (30) days of the
decision.

In Sandy

City

v.

Salt

Lake

County,

794 P. 2d 482 (Ct.

App. Utah 1990) , the Court found that "f [t]he statutory language
•plenary action for relief

therefrom%

presupposes the continued

existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an
appeal rather than a trial de novo."
Xanthos

v.

1984)).

Board

of

"However,

Adjustment,

Id.

at 486 (quoting

685 P. 2d 1032, 1034

(Utah

f

[t]he nature and extent of the review

depends on what happened below as reflected by a true record of
the proceedings, viewed in the light of accepted due process
requirements. '" Id.
Central

Weber Sewer

(quoting Denver
Improvement

Dist.

& Rio Grande W. RR. Co.

v.

, 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d

884, 887 (1955)).

Upon consideration of the events before the Board of
Adjustment, it becomes clear that the review must be more than
of the record of the proceedings. The hearings did not occur in
accordance with due process requirements.

"Evidence" was

submitted by people without personal knowledge. "Evidence" was
submitted in written form without any foundation or ability to
ask questions as to clarification or additions to the content
thereof. The first hearing was given without sufficient notice
to meet due process requirements.
received

a one-half

hour

In fact, the petitioners

telephonic

notice, while other

"interested parties" received sufficient written notice to
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prepare for the meeting. Also, the City Attorney, the Planning
Staff and the Board of Adjustment defined the issues to be
addressed during this hearing.
Board

of

Adjustment

Yet, the determination of the

considered

issues

about

which

the

Sevastopoulos1 were not prepared to respond and were told they
could not discuss.

The second hearing was meaningless due to

the failure of the Board of Adjustment to require property
evidence and to consider their statutory mandate.

Although the Rules of Evidence may not be enforced at the
Board

of

Adjustment

hearings,

due

process

mandates

the

opportunity to rebut the evidence used against the petitioners.
Such rebuttal could not be pursued against "witnesses" that were
not present, against witnesses without personal knowledge of
factual events, or in regard to issues that were not to be
addressed at the hearing.

This Court should require the satisfaction of due process
requirements and look only to competent evidence, provided by
personal knowledge, where there has been an opportunity to
cross-examine (or question in the informal context of this type
of

hearing).

The

District

Court was

consideration of the Administrative Record.
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not

restricted

to

ARGUMENT III
THE BOARD OP ADJUSTMENT DID NOT COMPLY
WITH ITS STATUTORY MANDATE
llf

[T]he

reviewing

court

may

consider

whether

the

municipality acted in conformance with its enabling statutes and
ordinances pursuant to its comprehensive plan, f lf Sandy City
Salt

Lake

County,

(quoting Naylor

v.

v.

794 P. 2d 482, 489 (Ct. App. Utah 1990)
Salt

Lake City

Corp.,

16 Utah 2d 192, 398

P.2d 27, 28-29 (1965)).

In

Salt

Telephone,

Lake

Citizens

Congress

v.

Mountain

States

846 P.2d 1245, n.5 (Utah 1992), the court noted that

"the authority of state administrative agencies to establish
legal rules is limited by the agency's organic statute, statutes
the agency

administers, constitutional

law, and the Utah

Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann.

§ § 63-

46b-l to -22, enacted in 1987 and made effective January 1,
1988."

Similarly, in Thurston

v. Cache County,

626 P.2d 440 (Utah

1981), the Court held that zoning authorities are bound by the
terms and standards of their ordinances and cannot grant or deny
conditional use permits in derogation of those standards.
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In the instant case, however, the Board of Adjustment did
not act in conformance with Section 21.80.270, Salt

Lake

Ordinance.

Ordinances,

Section 21.80.270, Salt

Lake

City

City

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A.
As empowered by Section 21.06.02 0, or its
successor, the board of adjustment shall have the
authority to grant special permits to exceed the
height
regulations,
provided
that
careful
consideration shall be given to the established
character
of
the
affected
neighborhood
and
streetscape, to the maintenance of public and private
views, and to matters of public safety, as follows:

4.
Fences, walls or other similar structures
incorporating ornamental features or architectural
enhancements which extend above the allowable height
limits;
5.
Fences, walls or other similar structures which
exceed the allowable height limits, when erected around
schools and approved recreational uses which require
special height considerations;
6.
Fences, walls or other similar structures which
exceed the allowable height limits, in cases where it is
determined that an undesirable condition exists because of
the abnormal intrusion of offensive levels of noise,
pollution, light or other encroachments on the rights to
privacy, safety, security and aesthetics.

C.
request:

The

board

of

adjustment

may

deny

any

1.
That is not in keeping with the character of
the neighborhood and urban design of the city;
2.
That would create a walled-in effect in the
front yard of any property in a residential district
where the clear character of the neighborhood in front
yard areas is one of open, free-flowing spaces from
property to property; or
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3.
When there is a driveway on the petitioner's
property or neighbor's property adjacent to the
proposed fence, wall or other similar structure that
presents a safety hazard.
(emphasis added).

It is unknown whether the Board of Adjustment considered
the

established

character

of

the neighborhood,

of which

petitioners presented numerous photographs; the public and
private views; or the public safety.
pictures

that

neighborhood

there

are

exceeding

many

the

six

It is clear from the

fences
foot

in

the

immediate

ordinance.

Most

importantly, the Board of Adjustment failed to consider matters
of public safety. Appellants have a pool in their back yard.
From the only competent testimony, it is clear that petitioners
have had unsupervised neighborhood children playing in their
back yard.

In addition, although a child had not yet drown in

this neighborhood, Ms. Marion B. Smith personally knew of a
child drowning in an affluent neighborhood, where children are
thought to be appropriately supervised; it can happen to anyone.
Apparently, however, the Board of Adjustment did not take this
fact into consideration.

Prior to the District Court's mandate, the Board of
Adjustment did not make any findings regarding these essential
elements. The Board of Adjustment failed to find the existence
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of any of the facts enumerated in the provisions regarding
denial of the variance.

Consideration of the record provided to the District Court
leads to the reasons for the lack of findings on these factors.
Although the Board of Adjustment may have desired to comply with
its duties and obligations, it simply did not have competent
evidence before it from which to make the required findings that
could support its determination.

The decision of the Board of

Adjustment should be reversed.

ARGUMENT IV
THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
The

Supplemental

Findings

entered

by

the

Board

of

Adjustment pursuant to the District Court's mandate include six
(6) simple paragraphs without any specific factual detail.
These

findings

particularly

clearly

are

contrary

to

the

evidence,

in light of the probative, reliable evidence

presented to the Board.

The Petitioners presented the following evidence in support
of their Variance Request:
a.

The purpose for requesting the variance was

to allow the construction of a fence approximately 8
feet in height. The variance is requested in order to
provide security for the swimming pool located on the
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property. Due to the steep grade on the lot which
required the driveway be cut below grades the eight
foot height is requested to provide security for the
pool area.
See Variance Request, Exhibit "A".
b.

The Variance Request provides that "Due to the

steep grade on the lot, the driveway located along the
property line where the fence is constructed, has been cut
below grade.10

The resulting fence height from the high

side is therefore low enough to be crossed by children in
the area."
c.

See Variance Request, Exhibit "A".

The Wall

Diagram designating

exactly which

sections violate the ordinance and variance granted by the
Board of Adjustment.

The Wall Diagram demonstrates that

the east side exceeds the height limitation granted by the
Board of Adjustment, (which allows measurement from the
highest abutting property), by eight-and-three-quarters
feet (8%') out of the 101.82' total length, and the west
side exceeds the height limitation in approximately twentysix-and-seven-hundredths feet (26.071); while recognizing
that these measurements are sums of points along the fence
line where the height limitation is exceeded.
d. Testimony of Mr. George Buys of Bush & Gudgell
Consulting Engineers, Inc., while Petitioners were present:

10

The driveway was built below grade by the previous
owners of the home.
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the property owners are out of town for extended
lengths of time and security for the swimming pool and
back yard area is very important. . . . there was a
retaining wall that allowed access into the
applicants1 rear yard. The applicants1 intent is to
provide security for the swimming pool by adding the
block fence on top of the retaining wall. . . . there
are a number of walls in the area that exceed the 6foot height.
1991 Findings, Exhibit
e.

ff fl

B , p. 2.

Testimony of Captain Sevastopoulos:

his neighbor's wooden fence was deteriorating and
their children climb over the fence to play basketball
in his back yard. . . . he travels extensively with
his business and is fearful that one of the children
or their friends might fall into the pool.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2.
he was told by the contractor that a permit for
the cinder-block fence was not needed. . . . some
neighborhood fences are as high as his is. He told of
neighborhood difficulties and problems with family
members in the neighborhood that have contributed to
the ill will against he and his wife.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. A C.
he travels extensively and wants to protect
himself from any liability which may result from the
neighborhood children gaining access to the pool. . .
. the increased height of the fence is needed to
provide this protection.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4.
f.
Testimony of Judith Moyle, resident of Tomahawk
Drive, but not an abutting property owner:
the city zoning requirements will be maintained
if there is a conflict with the private covenants.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. A C.
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g.
Pictures demonstrating character of neighborhood
and numerous other fences built therein that exceed the six
feet limitation.
Pictures, Exhibit "E".
h.
Presentation by Ms. Flanders on behalf of the
petitioners:
the increased height of the fence is to prevent
children from getting into the swimming pool area.
Prior to constructing the higher walls, there were
problems of this nature. . . [Petitioners] are out of
the country approximately six months out of the year.
Their concern is for the safety of the neighborhood
children. . . . the electronic pool cover does not
make conditions safer; the combination of water and
electricity actually creates a more dangerous
situation.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "0", p. 2.
Contrary to the assertion made by some of the neighbors,
there is no guard dog on [Petitioners'] property,
only a large dog. . . . this animal is boarded each
time her clients leave the country for an extended
period of time; therefore, it would not be a hindrance
to children getting into the back yard.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2.
a number of neighbors have signed a petition
indicating they have no objection to the height of the
fence. . . . it would be very costly to conform to the
height restriction because the fence has already been
faced with stucco.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
Ms. Flanders presented photographs of a wooden
fence along the east property line. . . . the wooden
structure has been referred to in previous testimony
by the neighbors as a 'well-preserved fence', but the
photographs show otherwise. . . . a child could very
easily climb over the wooden fence.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
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one of the considerations to be made in a
determination for a special permit or a variance is
how well the fence fits in with the neighborhood. She
presented photographs of other fences in the immediate
neighborhood to show that granting the variance
requested by the applicants will not be in conflict
with surrounding properties.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
the head of the Home Owners Association has
signed a petition as an individual stating there is no
objection to the height of the walls.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3.
i.
Testimony by Ms. Marion Smith, trustee of the
trust owning the subject property:
She has had the experience of living in a neighborhood
where there was a 4-foot wall around a swimming pool.
Several children climbed the wall and one of them
drowned.
She said that when the present owners
consulted her about the wall, she advised them to do
everything necessary to protect children from the
pool. She said this obviously was not good advice,
but she said the wall was built in good faith to
protect the neighborhood children.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4.

The "evidence" presented to the Board of Adjustment in
contravention of the Variance Request included

substantial

hearsay statements without any protection of authenticity, or
ability to question, due to the absence of the witnesses and any
verification of the statement such as by affidavit with attached
notary.11
11

Testimony by Ms. Judith Moyle, a resident of Tomahawk
Drive, but not an abutting property owner:
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Other "evidence" against the Variance Request was provided
without personal knowledge, such as the following:
j.

Testimony by Ms. Faith Cortrell, resident of

Tomahawk Drive, but not an abutting property owner:
there was a well-maintained brown wood fence between
the applicant's property and the adjacent property.
There is also a guard-dog on the Smith property that
would prevent children from entering their back yard.
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.
Ms. Cortrell's testimony about the fence clearly is rebutted by
the pictures taken and presented to the Board of Adjustment.
See Exhibit "E".

Further, as previously stated, the dog owned

by

is

Petitioners

Sevastopoulos'.

boarded

during

trips

taken

by

the

Finally, because Ms. Cortrell does not live

next door, and has not demonstrated any other way of knowing,
her testimony regarding the prevention of children from the back
yard is without any evidentiary basis.

Mr. Hal Hawk, who is the sole representative of the
architectural review committee for the home at 1425 E.
Tomahawk Drive, has not given any variances on height
outside the limits of the covenants.
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. Mr. Hawk was not present at
the hearing. See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", regarding record
of appearances.
A letter was introduced by Mr. Wheelwright that allegedly
was authored by Mr. Fields and that had been faxed from
California for substantive evidence in the proceeding. 1992
Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. The Fields apparently owned the
property prior to Petitioners. Petitioners have yet to be given
a copy of this letter.
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The initial Supplemental Finding provides that the Board
does not

find

any

"special

circumstances attached

to the

property which do not generally apply to other property in the
same district.

All properties on the north of Tomahawk Drive

bordering the City's foothill property have similar slope and
other topographical factors in common."
contravenes the evidence presented.
They

demonstrate

the

difference

This finding clearly

Consider the Pictures.
in

the

slope

on

the

Sevastopoulos' property as compared to the slope on the Calder's
and the Anderson's property.

The Sevastopoulos1 property was

excavated to allow for the installation of a swimming pool and
to create a flattened effect for the rear yard. The other yards
have not been changed in this manner. The excavation is severe,
and is to the extent that the pre-existing retaining wall along
the east side was even with the Calder's property, rather than
rising above the same. In addition, the Sevastopoulos' property
has a swimming pool with an electric cover.

Certainly, this

creates a special circumstance coming within the considerations
of public safety.

Finding No. 1 is contrary to the evidence.

Finding No. 2 states as follows:
No hardship exists from circumstances peculiar to the
property and not from conditions that are generally
applicable to the neighborhood because, again, all
uphill foothill properties on Tcrahawk are similarly
situated.
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This Finding diametrically opposes the evidence for the same
reasons that Finding No. 1 is insufficient; the properties are
not all similarly situated.

Further, there are hardships

because of peculiar circumstances in that the Sevastopoulos1 are
away from their residence for extended periods of time and there
is a pool in a back yard in which unsupervised, neighborhood
children have been caught playing.

Finding No. 3 is more egregious when considering the
evidence. The Finding states that to allow the fence to exceed
the height permitted "would constitute a visual blight and eye
sore on the neighborhood and would substantially affect the
comprehensive plan of zoning in the City.

This is especially

true given the unpermitted encroachment of the side fences into
the City's property on the foothills."

First, the Court has

available to it in the Addendum the Pictures demonstrating the
architectural design of the finished side of the fence and can
see the extent of which a change in "visual blight and eye sore"
would be achieved by cutting down the fence.

The Pictures

demonstrate the close proximity in height, except for the
difference in design, of the Sevastopoulos1 fence and the
Calder's fence.

In addition, consideration of the Pictures of other
walls/fences presented by the Sevastopoulos1, which walls were
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identified

as

existing

in

the

immediate

area,

makes

it

incomprehensible to determine the basis for the finding that the
fence would "substantially affect the comprehensive plan of
zoning in the City."

Finally as to Finding No. 3, the consideration of the
encroachment issue clearing was outside the jurisdiction of the
Board of Adjustment and was an issue expressly precluded from
the Sevastopoulos1 presentation by the City.12

Finding No. 4 completely ignores the competent evidence
regarding the children being caught

in the Sevastopoulos1

property and the testimony from the personal knowledge of the
trustee regarding the drowning of a child

in an affluent

neighborhood. It states that the only "hardship which may exist
caused by the removal of the side fences is either economic . .
. or . . . self-created by the petitioners' construction of the
improvements

without

first

seeking

a building

permit and

completing the improvements in violation of a stop-work order."

12

The Petitioners recognize that the encroachments caused
by themselves, as well as those caused by their neighbors and
other residents around the City, must be dealt with through the
enactment of a policy by the City and resulting compliance
therewith. This realization, however, does not make it proper
for the Findings to include reference to, and to be based on,
these encroachment issues.
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Further, Finding No. 4 ignores the evidence, including
testimony and pictures, that the fence has not been completed in
violation of a stop-work order or otherwise.

Finally, Finding No. 4 also fails to consider the evidence
provided that the Sevastopoulos1 were informed that they did not
need a building permit to construct the fence.13

Finding No. 5 states as follows:
Because the rear fence is lower and more easily
climbable than the side walls or fences there is no
safety justification for the excessively high side
walls. Further, the Board believes that there is no
significant safety risk posed by anyone climbing the
walls to enter the Petitioners1 pool. The pool can be
secured by means more appropriate and less violative
of the zoning code.
First, Finding No. 5 discusses the status of the rear
fence, however, the Board of Adjustment definitely understands
that the landscaping is not finished, and in fact, due to the
potential City policy regarding encroachments, the fence is

13

Clearly, the neighbors and the Board of Adjustment were
affected by the anger or frustration resulting from the
commencement of construction of the fence prior to the
Sevastopoulos1 requesting a permit. The testimony, however,
explained that the Sevastopoulos1 were unaware of the
requirement to obtain a permit and had personal reasons for
building the fence to the height planned. Additionally, the
neighbors demonstrated that many had appeared successfully
before the Board of Adjustment to obtain variances. Transcript,
Exhibit "D", p. 14. Unfortunately, the unusual sequence of
events seems to have severely affected the outcome of this
proceeding.
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likely to be removed by mandate.

The Board has utilized the

encroachment issues to injure the request by the Sevastopoulos1
and, yet, has refused to acknowledge the effect thereof when it
is in favor of the Sevastopoulos1.1A
that

no safety

The "belief" by the Board

risk is involved, clearly

contravenes the

competent evidence that children have been in the back yard and
that unsupervised children drown in unprotected swimming pools.
Finally, there was no evidence to support the finding that there
are other means available to secure the pool.

The final Finding No. 6 appears to be a conclusion of law,
rather than a finding of fact, in that it specifies that the
Sevastopoulos1 "failed to meet their burden of proving any of
the conditions above."

Again, however, this "finding" is

contrary to the competent, admissible evidence presented to the
Board of Adjustment.

ARGUMENT V
THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS TO JUSTIFY THE ACTION
OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
AND THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
"[T]he courts will not consider the wisdom, necessity, or
advisability or otherwise interfere with a zoning determination

14

Most likely, the City policy will require removal of the
rear fence. Thereafter, the Sevastopoulos1, or other property
owner, will build a new fence for protection.
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unless 'it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify
the action taken. f"

Sandy

City,

794 P.2d at 486.

In the

present case, there is no competent evidence, that meets the
requirements of due process, to provide a reasonable basis for
the action taken by the Board of Adjustment. Further, although
the Board of Adjustment clearly had the right and the ability to
determine credibility of witnesses, there is no justification
for making certain determinations that must be implied to
support the Board's decision.

Those necessary implications

include a finding that the character of the neighborhood would
be effected.

The Board of Adjustment was presented with

numerous photographs of walls and fences exceeding the six foot
height restriction. There was no contravention of the existence
of these walls in the immediate neighborhood.

One must assume that the Board of Adjustment determined
that public safety did not require the fence to be at this
height. Did it accept the testimony of the neighbors generally
stating that they did not believe that the children would be in
the petitioners' back yard over the testimony of the petitioners
that the children were in the back yard? Again, a belief is not
personal

knowledge and

should not be used to contradict

competent testimony.
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As to public views, did the Board of Adjustment determine
that it was more important for Ms. Calder, the neighbor to the
immediate east of the petitioners, to be able to see over her
six foot fence and into the back yard of the petitioners?

In

this regard, the Court should compare the height differences of
the wooden fence on the Calders1 property and the wall on the
east side of petitioners1 property.

In fact, the Calderfs

objected to the height of the west fence, not the east fence.
See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3.

CONCLUSION
In the present case, the Sevastopoulos1 yet have had an
opportunity to present their request for a variance to an
impartial forum with due process protections that are deserved
in this type of proceeding.

The evidence, and thus, the

determination of the Board, was tainted.

The chances of the

Sevastopoulos1 were not the same as those of the other neighbors
that had received variances from the Board.

Yes, some of this

was due to the Sevastopoulos1 lack of understanding regarding
the necessity of a permit.
should

That lack of knowledge, however,

not effect the considerations

entitled to a permit.

of whether they are

Finally, the issues about possible

encroachments cannot be allowed to affect the determination
regarding the variance because such effect clearly contravenes
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the jurisdictional and due process requirements of notice and
opportunity.

A new hearing should be held before an impartial tribunal.

WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that they be
granted the opportunity to appear in a trial de novo,

which

should meet the standards of due process, and that the Court
grant such further relief as it deems proper.
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